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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BANKS AND BANKING
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A DEPOSITOR AND THE DEPOSITORY
BANK; RIGHT TO A PREFERENCE ON INSOLVENCY
The plaintiff was a depositor in the Standard Trust Bank of Cleve-
land. On Saturday morning, December 19, 1931, he deposited checks
on local banks, indorsed in blank, to the amount of $1295.6o. On the
following Monday, before the checks were put through clearance, the
Superintendent of Banks took charge of the bank for liquidation pur-
poses. The checks were then sent through clearance and the proceeds
were received by the liquidating agent. There was no special agree-
ment, other than the words on the deposit slip, that the, checks were
deposited for the purpose of collection. The deposit slip read: "In re-
ceiving items for deposit or collection, this bank acts only as depositors'
collecting agent * * *." The commercial passbook read: "All items
payable outside the city are taken with the understanding that this bank
acts as your collecting agent * * *." The Superintendent of Banks re-
jected the plaintiff's claim for a preference, after which this suit was
commenced in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. The
trial court found for the plaintiff and its .decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The Ohio Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., dissent-
ing, held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a preferred claim. Squire,
Supt. of Banks v. Goulder, 131 Ohio St. lO6, 2 N.E. (2d) 2, 5 Ohio
Op. 465 (1936).
In the absence of statute, the plaintiff's right to a preferred claim
depends upon the relationship which the deposit in question created be-
tween the plaintiff and the depository bank. If the title to the checks
passed to the bank, the relationship of debtor-creditor arose, and the
plaintiff can take only as a general creditor. On the other hand, if the
depositor retained title to the instruments, the relationship became one of
principal and agent, and the plaintiff has a valid right to a preferred
claim.
It is well settled that the title to checks or other paper deposited for
purposes of collection does not pass to the depository bank. Jones v. K-
breth, 49 Ohio St. 40i, 31 N.E. 346 (1892); Helsinger v. Tricket,
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86 Ohio St. 286, 99 N.E. 305, Ann. Cas. 19 I 3 D 421 (I912); Pas-
caganda National Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 3 Fed. (2d) 465
(1921); Richardson v. Louisvlle Banking Co., 94 Fed. 442, 36
C.C.A. 307 (1899); Yerkes v. National Bank, 69 N.Y. 382, 25 Am.
Rep. 208 (1877). Where the instrument has been restrictively indorsed
"for collection," it is especially clear that the title was intended to remain
in the depositor, and that the bank was to become merely an agent for
collection. First National Bank v. First National Bank, 58 Ohio St.
207, 5o N.E. 723, 65 Am. St. Rep. 748, 41 L.R.A. 584 (1898);
Sweeney v. Easter, i Wall. 166, 17 L. Ed. 681 (1863). However,
this is true even if the instrument was indorsed in blank, if the parties
intended the deposit to be one for collection only. Richardson v. New
Orleans Coffee Co., 102 Fed. 785, 43 C.C.A. 583 (1900).
But where the instrument is indorsed without restriction and there
is no special agreement that it is taken for collection only, there is a dis-
tinct conflict of authority as to the relationship which the deposit creates
between the depositor and the bank. Two views have been set forth,
both of which have found ample support among the reported cases. One
view, which seems to represent the weight of authority, is that the title
passes to the bank, thus creating the status of debtor-creditor. Shaw v.
Bauman, 34 Ohio St. 25 (877); Bank v. Brewing Co., 50 Ohio St.
151, 33 N.E. 1054, 4o Am. St. Rep. 66o (1893); The Smith and
Setron Printing Co. v. The State, ex rel Fulton, 40 Ohio App. 32
(1931); Howev. Akron Say. Bank, 16 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 320(1905);
Heinrich, Ex'r v. First National Bank, 219 N.Y. I, 113 N.E. 531,
L.R.A. 19 17A 655 (1916); Security National Bank v. Old National
Bank, 241 Fed. I, 154 C.C.A. 1 (1917); Taft v. Quinsigamond Na-
tional Bank, 172 Mass. 363, 52 N.E. 387 (1899). And the above
rule is applicable even though the bank reserves the right to charge the
depositor's account with the amount of the checks in case of their dis-
honor. The Smith and Setron Printing Co. v. Fulton, supra; Noble v.
Doughten, 72 Kans. 336, 83 Pac. 1048, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1167
(1905); Plumas County Bank v. Bank of Rideout, Smith & Co., 165
Cal. 126, 131 Pac. 360, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 552 (1913). The view
that the tide passes to the bank is strengthened and sometimes based upon
the fact that the depositor may draw upon or has drawn upon the de-
posit. A1merican Trust & Savings Bank v. Gueder, P. Mfg. Co., 15o
I-I 336, 37 N.E. 227 (1894); Security Bank v. Northwestern Fuel
CO., 58 Minn. 141, 59 N.W. 987 (1894). However, the above rule,
being based upon the presumed intent of the parties, yields to a mani-
festation of a contrary intent, and a notice in the bank book or on the
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deposit slip that the bank acts only as a collecting agent prevents the pass-
age of title. South Park Foundry & Mach. Go. v. Chicago & G.W.R.
Co., 75 Minn. I86, 77 N.W. 796 (1899); People, ex rel Russell v.
Mich. Ave. Trust Co., 242 I1. App. 579 (1926).
The opposing view is that, even though there is no special agreement
that the deposit is for collection purposes, still there is a presumption to
that effect and title remains in the depositor. Baldwin State Bank v.
NationalBank, 144 Ga. I81, 86 S.E. 538 (1915); La. Ice Co. v. State
National Bank, McGlain (La) 181 (1881); Gulf State Lumber Co.
v. Citizens' First National Bank, 30 Ga. App. 709, 119 S.E. 426
(1923). Even though credit is given the depositor, title remains in him.
Beal v. Somerville, 50 Fed. 647, I C.C.A. 598, 5 U. S. App. 14, 17
L.R.A. 291 (1892); U. S. National Bank v. Geer, 53 Nebr. 67, 73
N.W. 266, 41 L.R.A. 439 (1897). However, if the depositor has
actually drawn upon the deposit, title has passed to the bank. Standard
Trust Co. v. Commercial National Bank, 166 N. C. I12, 81 S.E. 1074
(1914); W. I. Barton Seed, Feed, & Implement Co. v. Mercantile
National Bank, 128 Tenn. 320, 16o S.W. 848 (1913); Fourth Na-
tional Bank v. Mayer, 89 Ga. io8, 14 S.E. 891 (1892); and see
Re Jarmarlousky, 249 Fed. 319, 161 C.C.A. 327, L.R.A. i 9 i8E
634 (1918).
Ohio cases have accepted the doctrine that in the absence of special
circumstances the deposit is a general one and the depositor becomes a
creditor of the bank. Bank v. Brewing Co., supra; Shaw v. Bauman,
supra; Fulton v. Univ. of Dayton, 129 Ohio St. 9o , 193 N.E. 758,
i Ohio Op. 408, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 427 (934); Fulton v. Main, 128
Ohio St. 457, 191 N.E. 742, 40 Ohio L. Rep. 65o (934). But if the
bank accepts the deposit for a specific purpose, it becomes only an agent
of the depositor. Kopp Clay Co. v. Fulton, 125 Ohio St. 512, 182 N.E.
494, 36 Ohio L. Rep. 421 (1932).
The majority opinion in the principal case approved the rule that in
the absence of a special agreement, title passes to the bank. It held that
the notice on the deposit slip, once clarified by the statement on the pass
book, clearly applied only to checks on banks outside the city. The dis-
sent was based mainly on a contrary interpretation of this notice and
also on the fact that the plaintiff did not draw upon the deposit, nor had
he been in the habit of drawing on such depositts, before collection.
Although the general rule that title presumedly passes to the bank seems
to be supported by sound reason and authority, yet it is submitted that on
the facts of the instant-case the court might well have found, with the
dissenting judge, that the intention of the parties was otherwise.
Section 714, Ohio Gen. Code, provides that "In any case where any
bank * * * shall have in its possession the proceeds realized from the
collection of any negotiable instrument by it or by any other collecting
agency, at the time that such bank is dosed by the superintendent of
banks of Ohio * * * the assets of such bank so dosed shall be impressed
with a trust in behalf of the owner of the instrument the proceeds of
which are held by such bank so dosed * * * and the owner of the
negotiable instrument shall be entitled to payment upon liquidation of
the assets of such bank as a preferred claim."
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in the instant case failed
to mention this statutory provision. But in Fulton v. Baker-Toledo Co.,
128 Ohio St. 226, 19o N.E. 459, 40 Ohio L. Rep. 647, 93 A.L.R.
933, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 473 (1934), the Supreme Court took the view
that Section 714 does not extend to those cases where formerly a debtor-
creditor relationship existed. In the light of the express wording of the
statute that "the owner * * * shall be entitled to a preferred claim," it
would seem that the court was correct and that the statute presupposes
an agency relationship. Therefore, having determined that the status
between the parties was that of debtor-creditor, the court was justified,
on the basis of its holding in Fulton v. Baker-Toledo Co., supra, in dis-
regarding the above statute.
Had the facts in the principal case shown that the bank on the receipt
of the deposit in question was insolvent to the knowledge of its officers,
there would have been such fraud as to prevent the passage of title to the
bank, and to entitle the plaintiff to have a trust for his benefit imposed
upon the funds in the hands of the superintendent. Orme v. Baker, 74
Ohio St. 337, 78 N.E. 439, 113 Am. St. Rep. 968 (i9o6). Gener-
ally, under such circumstances, the courts have established a trust or
preference, provided the requirements of tracing or augmentation of
assets, whichever the forum requires, have been met. Beal v. Someruille,
supra; St. Louis & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 566,
33 L.Ed. 683, io S. Ct. 390 (189o); Cragie v. Hadley, 99 N.Y.
131, 52 Am. Rep. 9, x N.E. 537 (I885). And see 2o A.L.R. 12o6,
25 A.L.R. 728, 37 A.L.R. 620. In Ohio, though the depositor must
be able to trace the funds into the bank's assets to entitle him to a trust
or preference, it is not essential that he trace the particular dollars in
specie. Orme v. Baker, supra; Fulton v. Univ. of Dayton, supra.
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